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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MORAL INTUITIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

MILTON C. REGAN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION
Lawyers both shape and are shaped by the organizational environments in
which they practice. They often play important roles in creating and operating
ethics and legal compliance programs. Those programs in turn affect the
milieu in which the lawyer must carry on her work. We can think of this
milieu in a broad sense as an organization’s culture. Many efforts to
understand and respond to a succession of corporate scandals over the last few
years have underscored the importance of organizational culture in shaping the
behavior of individuals.1 This focus reflects appreciation that even if an

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Carol Needham for
inviting me to submit a paper based on my participation on the Association of American Law
Schools panel in January 2007 that she organized. The panel served as the impetus for this
article. I am grateful to Elizabeth Chambliss, Donald Langevoort, Susan Martyn, and John
Mikhail for comments on an earlier draft.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Father Robert F. Drinan, S.J., whose moral
intuitions never failed him.
1. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Responsibility of Corporations
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003); Christine E. Early, Kate Odabashian & Michael Willenborg, Some
Thoughts on the Audit Failure at Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of
Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1013 (2003); Ronald R. Sims & Johannes
Brinkman, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003);
William Arthur Wines & J. Brooke Hamilton III, Observations on the Need to Redesign
Organizations and to Refocus Corporation Law to Promote Ethical Behavior and Discourage
Illegal Conduct, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43 (2003). A related concept is an organization’s “ethical
infrastructure.” See, e.g., Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Kristin Smith-Crowe & Elizabeth E. Umphress,
Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical Infrastructure in Organizations, 16 SOC.
JUST. RES. 285, 286–87 (2003).
For elaboration of this concept as applied to law firms, see Elizabeth Chambliss, The
Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119 (2005); Elizabeth
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 335 (2003); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 559 (2002); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691
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organization has adopted elaborate rules and policies designed to ensure legal
compliance and ethical behavior, those pronouncements will be ineffective if
other norms and incentives promote contrary conduct.
Enron, for example, had a supposedly state-of-the-art ethics code, risk
management capability, and board of directors oversight process, all of which
formally conveyed the importance of ethical behavior. The company also,
however, provided lavish rewards for employees who could negotiate deals
that resulted in immediate recognition of revenue and conducted a “rank and
yank” personnel evaluation process that engendered brutal competition.2 The
result was a poisonous culture that spawned disdain for legal and accounting
rules, as well as for any broader conception of ethics.
“Culture,” as one set of scholars observes, “helps to establish what is
considered legitimate or unacceptable in an organization.”3 In this respect,
Enron’s culture overwhelmed whatever formal ethics and compliance
measures that it had adopted. Crucial in identifying a corporation’s culture,
suggests another observer, are:
the employees’ perceptions of the corporation’s values—as reflected by the
corporation’s mission statement and code of ethics, the criteria for business
decisions, the words and actions of leaders, the handling of conflicts of
interest, the reward system, the guidance provided to employees concerning
4
dealing with ethical issues, and the monitoring system.

Amendments to the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 2004
are consistent with a broad focus that looks beyond formal programs to more
complex influences on behavior. They add to the criteria for an effective legal
compliance and ethics program the requirement that an organization “promote
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to
compliance with the law.”5
Responding to the call for creating and sustaining an ethical culture in
organizations requires appreciating the subtle ways in which various
characteristics of an organization may work in tandem or at cross-purposes in
shaping behavior. The idea is to identify the influences likely to be most
important, analyze how people are apt to respond to them, and revise them if
(2002); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical
Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998).
2. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
3. LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY RICHARD WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 235 (2003).
4. Dallas, supra note 1, at 3.
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2006); see also David Hess,
Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 726 (2006).
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necessary so that they create the right kinds of incentives when individuals are
deciding how to act.
This can be a tall order even if we assume that most behavior is the result
of a deliberative process that weighs multiple risks and rewards. It is even
more daunting if we accept the notion that conscious deliberation typically
plays but a minor role in shaping behavior. A focus on what two scholars
describe as “the unbearable automaticity of being” posits that “most of a
person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and
deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion by features
of the environment and that operate outside of conscious awareness and
guidance.”6
A growing body of scholarship, described as cognitive psychology or
behavioral economics, has focused on various cognitive tendencies that reflect
the operation of these non-conscious processes.7 It has analyzed, for instance,
how such certain biases can obscure morally salient features of a situation, and
how they can undermine a sense of personal responsibility even when a person
recognizes issues of moral concern.8 Several scholars also have described how
organizational settings can accentuate these propensities.9 This work suggests

6. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 462 (1999).
7. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (6th ed.
2006); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Hugh Schwartz, Behavioral
Economics in a Nutshell: The Complicating But Sometimes Critical Considerations (Jan. 20,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960222; Cass R. Sunstein,
Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECOMONICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
8. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Max H. Bazerman & Dolly Chugh, How (Un)Ethical Are
You?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2003, at 56; Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of
Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 629 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001);
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1998); Donald
C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for
Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993); David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience,
in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 94 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1321–25
(2006); Ann E. Tensbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223 (2004).
9. See, e.g., CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS (David
M. Messick & Ann E. Tensbrunsel eds., 1996); CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND
SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Don A. Moore, Daylian M.
Cain, George Lowenstein & Max H. Bazerman eds., 2005); SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL
BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS (John M. Darley, David M. Messick & Tom R. Tyler eds., 2001);
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that there are predictable patterns of both cognition and behavior that spring
from non-conscious sources, and that these patterns can persist despite
conscious awareness of their existence.
The durability of these patterns poses a challenge to any effort to foster an
ethical organizational culture. We have to think carefully about when certain
tendencies are likely to arise, what impacts they are likely to have, and if and
how they might be amenable to influence. In some cases, we may want to
counteract these tendencies. So, for instance, we may try to reduce the
influence of self-serving rationalizations by ensuring that a dialogue includes
contributions from people with no stake in the outcome of a project. In other
cases, we may want to capitalize on a certain propensity. Thus, we may want
to ensure that people in formal positions of authority, or in leadership positions
within groups, model commitment to certain important values because people
are likely to take their behavioral cues from such individuals. In still other
cases, habits may stubbornly resist attempts to change them, so we need to
think carefully how to work around especially tenacious behavior. In this way,
work on cognitive psychology and behavioral economics can inform our
attempts to promote legal compliance and ethical behavior.
In this article, I want to discuss another strand of research that is rooted in
the study of non-conscious mental processes, and to consider its implications
for ethics and culture in the organizational setting. This is work on the process
that we use to identify and respond to situations that raise what we think of as
distinctly moral questions. A growing body of research suggests that a large
portion of this process involves automatic non-conscious cognitive and
emotional reactions rather than conscious deliberation. One way to think of
these reactions is that they reflect reliance on moral intuitions.10 When such
intuitions arise, we do not engage in moral reasoning in order to arrive at a
conclusion. Instead, we do so in order to justify a conclusion that we have
already reached. In other words, moral conclusions precede, rather than
follow, moral reasoning.
If this research accurately captures much of our moral experience, what
does it suggest about what is necessary to foster an ethical organizational
culture? At first blush, the implications seem unsettling. The non-conscious
realm is commonly associated with irrational and arbitrary impulses, and
morality often is characterized as the hard-won achievement of reason over
these unruly forces. If most of our moral judgments are the product of nonconscious processes, how can we hope to understand, much less influence, our
moral responses? Are moral reactions fundamentally inscrutable and beyond
appeals to reason? If reason has no persuasive force, does appreciation of the
James A. Fanto, Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives from
Law and Social Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005).
10. See infra note 34.
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non-conscious source of our moral judgments suggest that any effort to
promote ethical conduct must rest on a crude behaviorism that manipulates
penalties and rewards?
I believe that acknowledging the prominent role of non-conscious
processes in shaping moral responses need not inevitably lead either to fatalism
or Skinnerian behaviorism. Research has begun to shed light on how these
processes operate. Related work has suggested how our moral responses may
be rooted in human evolution. This perspective focuses on the ways in which
our capacity for moral judgment is embedded in physical and mental processes
that have provided an adaptive advantage in human evolution.11 These bodies
of research contribute to a richer portrait of human cognition and behavior that
can be valuable in thinking about how to promote ethical awareness and
conduct. As with work in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, a
more refined appreciation of human tendencies—both their operation and their
possible origins—”may help us to better understand what educational and
policy interventions may facilitate good conduct and ameliorate bad
conduct.”12
It is important at the outset to emphasize that gaining a more subtle
understanding of the process of making moral judgments does not mean that
this process should have any privileged status in our ethical deliberation. That
we tend to reach such judgments in a certain way does not mean that we should
do so. This “naturalistic fallacy” has been subject to trenchant criticism; I
agree that we cannot derive an ought from an is.13 How we are is not
necessarily how we would like to be. Indeed, morality can be seen as an effort
to bridge the gap. Nor do the possible evolutionary functions of cognitive and
behavioral tendencies mean that we should automatically defer to them. Aside
from the pitfalls of the naturalistic fallacy, those tendencies may have emerged
and played a role at a stage in human evolution far different from our current
circumstances. What once was functional may no longer be, and in fact may
be dysfunctional in certain ways.

11. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL ETHICAL FACTS: EVOLUTION,
CONNECTIONISM, AND MORAL COGNITION (2003); ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN
REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988); SHAUN NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL
RULES: ON THE NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL JUDGMENT (2004); MATT RIDLEY, THE
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996); JAMES
Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993). Many theorists in this camp tend to claim David Hume
as an ancestor because of his emphasis on morality as the expression of an innate sentiment. See
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (Kessinger Publishing
2004) (1751).
12. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches (Apr.
19, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-psych-emp/.
13. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1888);
GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 1966) (1903).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

946

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:941

What I am claiming is that, as Owen Flanagan puts it, “seeing clearly the
kinds of persons we are is a necessary condition for any productive ethical
reflection.”14 If there were such a thing as a normative theory of human
movement, it would be futile if it exhorted us to fly.15 Efforts to create an
organizational culture that encouraged people to fly would be doomed as well.
In thinking about ethics, we need to have a sense of what lies between simply
accommodating what we tend to do and demanding that we fly.16 Disciplines
such as anthropology, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, primatology,
and neurology all can offer guidance for this project, even as we remain free to
decide what prescriptive significance to attach to their descriptive insights.
Aside from enhanced self-understanding, these insights may suggest what
kinds of efforts to promote ethical behavior are most likely to be successful
because they either counteract or build on durable human tendencies.
In this article, I want to suggest one way in which research on moral
intuitions might inform our understanding of the possibilities of and limits on
efforts to foster an ethical organizational culture. This suggestion is cautious
and tentative. I am well aware of the perils of attempting to extrapolate from
other disciplines with which I am not intimately familiar, especially when
those disciplines themselves are not characterized by consensus. I take some
comfort from the fact that my conclusion is consistent with one prominent
account of organizational life, even if I arrive at that conclusion by a different
route. In any event, my main purpose is to stimulate further thought and to
encourage research on the implications of the role of intuitions in ethical
judgment and behavior.17
Before I begin, it is worth identifying some simplifying assumptions that I
will adopt in the hope of sketching the broad outlines of lessons that research
on moral intuitions might offer. These assumptions are embedded in the
statement that I will focus on the implications of this research for attempts to
14. OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
REALISM 16 (1991).
15. One common way of expressing this idea is that “ought implies can.” See Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘“Ought” Conversationally Implies “Can”’, 93 PHIL. REV. 249 (1984).
While the maxim is not without controversy, it seems to capture at least a commonsensical, if not
logical, insight. See id.
16. As Owen Flanagan suggests, a Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism provides:
“Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character,
decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for
creatures like us.” FLANAGAN, supra note 14, at 32.
17. Some scholars in business ethics have already begun to take work on moral intuitions
into account. See Scott J. Reynolds, A Neurocognitive Model of the Ethical Decision-Making
Process: Implications for Study and Practice, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 737 (2006); Scott
Sonenshein, The Role of Construction, Intuition, and Justification in Responding to Ethical Issues
at Work: The Sensemaking-Intuition Model, ACAD. MGMT. REV. (forthcoming) (May 2006
manuscript on file with author).
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promote an “ethical organizational culture.” Each of the terms in quotation
marks is more complex than I will treat it in this article.
First, I will treat the “organization” as a single actor, when of course it can
act only through numerous individuals. These individuals are unlikely to be
unanimous about what courses of action the organization should pursue, and
would face challenges in coordinating their efforts even if they were. Both
formal and informal structures of power shape and constrain what any
individual or group can do. Any initiative has to be undertaken on many fronts
and contend with a multitude of attitudes and responses. Those who would
have an organization attempt to encourage ethical behavior thus need to
consider carefully the levers and avenues of influence to employ in this effort.
A second point, related to the first, is that I will speak of an “ethical”
culture as a discrete state of affairs, presumably in contrast to one that is not
ethical. This binary distinction does not hold up in the real world.
Organizations typically are not either ethical or unethical. An organization is
likely to speak in many voices with multiple messages. Some may explicitly
relate to ethics; many others will not, but may indirectly communicate
something about ethical expectations. There will be shades of emphasis and
nuances of meaning, and no two individuals are likely to “read” the culture in
exactly the same way. A more precise formulation thus may be that we should
consider how organizations might heighten the importance of ethical
considerations in their operations, rather than how they can move their cultures
into the ethical category.
Finally, I will tend to portray organizational “culture” as a relatively
monolithic phenomenon. This suggests a relative unity of purpose that
distinguishes one organization from another. As Joanne Martin observes,
however, this is only one of at least three different perspectives on
organizational culture.18 It represents an “integration perspective,” which
“sees consensus (although not necessarily unanimity) throughout an
organization.”19 From this perspective, each element of the organization
mutually reinforces the others.
By contrast, a “differentiation perspective” is sensitive to inconsistent
interpretations within an organization.20 From this perspective, consensus
exists only on the subcultural level.21 Subcultures “may exist in harmony,
independently, or in conflict with each other.”22 They “are like islands of
clarity in a sea of ambiguity.”23 Finally, a “fragmentation perspective”

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See JOANNE MARTIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: MAPPING THE TERRAIN 94 (2002).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
MARTIN, supra note 18, at 94.
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emphasizes ambiguity, treating consensus as “transient and issue specific.”24 It
conceptualizes the relationships among different constituencies and structures
of the organization as neither clearly consistent nor clearly inconsistent.25
As Martin suggests, each of these perspectives provides insights on
organizational life, and each has its blind spots. Some aspects of culture will
be shared by most members, others will be interpreted by different groups, and
still others “will be interpreted ambiguously, with irony, paradox, and
irreconcilable tensions.”26 She suggests that researchers should attempt to use
all three perspectives simultaneously because this will provide a richer set of
insights than any single viewpoint.27 My analysis will focus on organizations
generally, rather than any particular one, but I acknowledge that any given
organization will exhibit the complex and layered sets of meanings that Martin
describes.
I. MORAL INTUITIONISM
A.

The Influence of Non-Conscious Cognition

A substantial body of work in cognitive psychology and behavioral
economics underscores that many of our cognitive and behavioral tendencies
are the product of processes that occur outside our awareness.28 Many of these
tendencies are intensified in the organizational setting, with the result that
people working in an organization face distinctive challenges in recognizing
and acting upon ethical issues.29
Virtually any organization of significant size, for instance, will feature
some fragmentation of knowledge. People who occupy different roles may
have an understanding of some features of a situation but not all of them. Like
the individuals in contact with various parts of the proverbial elephant, each
may have a distinctive but incomplete belief about what is going on.
In addition, organizations typically are characterized by diffusion of
responsibilities. Those who occupy different roles will tend to seek out only
the information they regard as necessary for their work. Indeed, in a world of
accelerating flows of information, doing so can become a necessity for being
able to function. How many of us, for instance, hit the delete button after only
a second’s perusal of the content—or even subject heading—of all the emails
we receive each day? This self-protective reflex may insulate people even

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002); Reynolds, supra note 17; Sonenshein, supra note 17.
29. See infra Part II.
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more deeply within the perspectives and attitudes of their roles, and may create
a disincentive to seek information that does not seem directly relevant.
These propensities can complicate the ability to recognize the salience of
ethical considerations in a given situation, as well as the willingness to act on
the basis of them. Absent the rare entity that is thoroughly corrupt, most daily
behavior can be interpreted in terms of organizational routines that raise no
ethical issues. Identifying such issues therefore requires an individual to
escape the interpretive grip of these routines in order to identify anomalies that
may signal matters of ethical significance.
Acknowledging that a situation raises ethical concerns takes mental and
emotional energy. It means that we cannot rely on our comfortable cognitive
and behavioral routines. Instead, we have to focus more self-consciously on
what the situation means and what it may require of us. It also means that we
may have to question those with whom we have social relationships or defend
ourselves to them, placing us both in the potentially awkward and stressful
position of making ethical judgments about one another. All things
considered, most people are inclined to avoid being in this situation if they can.
Several psychological mechanisms help us do so. In general, people rely
on social and organizational “scripts” to organize experience and make it
intelligible.30 If a situation “involves a familiar class of problems or issues, it
is likely to be handled via existing cognitive structures or scripts—scripts that
typically include no ethical component in their cognitive content.”31 In
addition, people have a robust capacity for using “self-serving cognitive
frames” in order to “attenuate or mitigate their perceptions of duty and
obligation.”32 These frames enable them to maintain a positive self-image of
themselves as “rational, blameless, and consistent decision makers.”33
Recent research has focused on moral judgment in particular as one
domain in which non-conscious processes play a prominent role.34 It suggests
30. See Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed
Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 385 (1992),
31. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
32. Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCT, supra
note 9, at 59, 69.
33. Id. at 70.
34. See, e.g., Max Bazerman & Maharzin R. Banaji, The Social Psychology of Ordinary
Ethical Failures, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 111 (2004); Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious
Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082 (2006); Joshua Greene,
From Neural “Is” to Moral “Ought”: What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral
Psychology?, 4 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 847 (2003); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog
and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV.
814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail]; Jonathan Haidt, The
Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 283 (2004); Jonathan Haidt
& Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology, in 3
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that only a small percentage of what we think of as judgments about situations
with potential moral implications is the product of reasoned analysis.35
Instead, most judgments reflect immediate intuitive reactions, which
individuals then justify post hoc by recourse to what they regard as socially
acceptable reasons.36 On this account, a good portion of what we think of as
moral reasoning therefore consists not of efforts to decide what to do, but of
attempts to rationalize what we have already done or committed ourselves to
do.
This research should give pause to those who are interested in promoting
ethical organizational cultures. First, many ethical appeals are designed to
affect conscious deliberation. A substantial body of scholarship in business
and legal ethics, for instance, is devoted to clarifying morally relevant features
of various situations, providing systematic ways of reasoning about those
features, and justifying conclusions about how they should be reconciled.37
Unless we engage people’s intuitions, however, such ethical appeals may not
have much effect on behavior. Rather, they may simply add to the repertoire
of justifications that people are able to offer after they have already reached a
conclusion. Second, to the extent that such ethical appeals do influence
behavior rather than simply provide rationalizations, they may have to do so by
triggering intuitions rather than by presenting convincing logical arguments.
Engaging in the latter process is an activity that is probably more familiar to us
than participating in the first.
Promoting ethical behavior in organizations thus would seem to require
better understanding of potentially powerful non-conscious processes that
shape our moral intuitions. An emerging body of work has tried to determine
more precisely how non-conscious processes operate and the role they play in

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming) (Feb. 5, 2006 manuscript on
file with author); Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared
Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues, DAEDALUS, Fall 2004, at 55; Jonathan Haidt &
Craig Joseph, The Moral Mind: How Five Sets of Innate Intuitions Guide the Development of
Many Culture-Specific Virtues, and Perhaps Even Modules, in 3 THE INNATE MIND (P.
Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich eds., forthcoming) (Dec. 21, 2006 manuscript on file with
author) [hereinafter Haidt & Joseph, The Moral Mind]; Marc Hauser et al., A Dissociation
Between Moral Judgments and Justifications, 22 MIND & LANGUAGE 1 (2007); John Mikhail,
Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future, TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI.
(forthincoming 2007); Reynolds, supra note 17; Sonenshein, supra note 17.
35. See, e.g., Cushman et al., supra note 34, at 1083.
36. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 17, at 742
37. In business ethics, see, for example, ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
APPROACH (Thomas Donaldson et al. eds., 7th ed. 2002). In legal ethics, see DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998). On the professions more generally, see
ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
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moral cognition.38 This research is suggestive, rather than definitive. It holds
some promise, however, for illuminating these processes, for rethinking some
conventional assumptions about ethics, and for identifying ways in which we
might try to strengthen or undermine non-conscious cognitive operations to
enhance the likelihood of ethical behavior.
B.

Elements of Moral Experience

One useful way of approaching this research is to begin with a widely-used
framework that depicts moral experience as comprised of four elements: moral
awareness, moral judgment or reasoning, moral motivation, and moral
behavior.39 In some cases, we can think of these elements as steps in a
sequence that culminates in behavior. In other cases—those with which I am
most concerned here—this framework describes a process in which the four
elements appear to occur simultaneously.
The first element is moral awareness.40 This is the point at which an
individual recognizes that she is confronting a situation with a moral
dimension.41 This awareness is the product of an interaction between
individual characteristics and contextual cues.42 Different combinations of
variables can stimulate or repress ethical awareness.43 “[I]dentifying a moral
issue” thus involves “an interpretive process wherein the individual recognizes
that a moral problem exists in a situation, or that a moral standard or principle
is relevant to the circumstances.”44
Understanding moral awareness has been refined by appreciation of the
extent to which people engage in the process of “sensemaking.”45 We all are
confronted with multiple stimuli in our environment, and we must impose
some structure upon it for it to “make sense.”46 We use various cues, patterns,
routines, and scripts, typically created jointly with others, to help us
accomplish this task. We still, however, may encounter stimuli that do not fit
38. See, e.g., Cordelia Fine, Is the Emotional Dog Wagging Its Rational Tail, or Chasing It?
Reason in Moral Judgment, 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 83 (2006); Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note
34; Reynolds, supra note 17.
39. JAMES REST ET AL., POSTCONVENTIONAL MORAL THINKING: A NEO-KOHLBERGIAN
APPROACH (1999); Linda K. Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J.
MGMT. 951, 952 (2006).
40. See Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 953.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 953–54.
43. See id. at 954.
44. Id. at 953.
45. On sense-making generally, see KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS
(1995); Karl E. Weick et al., Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking, 16 ORG. SCI. 409
(2005). For an application of the concept to ethics in the organizational context, see Sonenshein,
supra note 17.
46. See Weick et al., supra note 45.
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comfortably into any of these structures. We may, for instance, encounter
equivocality: “the existence of several different, simultaneous
interpretations.”47 Or we may confront uncertainty: “a lack of information that
makes constructing a plausible interpretation about a situation difficult.”48
The relevant point about sensemaking for my purposes is that moral
awareness is not simply a matter of seeing or failing to see moral issues that
inhere in a situation independently of perception. Instead, it’s the result of a
process of active construction that involves complex interaction among an
individual, her environment, and other people.
The second element in a framework of moral experience is moral
judgment, or moral reasoning.49 Once a person acknowledges the existence of
a moral issue, she attempts to determine the most appropriate response to that
issue. What demands does the situation make on her and/or others? What
should she do in order to act morally? Much work in ethics that focuses on
this element is prescriptive, attempting to provide either decision procedures or
substantive principles for resolving moral questions.
On the descriptive level, Kohlberg’s theory of stages of moral reasoning is
perhaps the most prominent effort to describe various levels of competence in
moral judgment.50 That theory depicts advancement in moral reasoning as a
process of appreciating a successively more abstract set of concerns that can be
increasingly universalized (and thus includes a prescriptive element as well).51
Other research has focused on what kinds of issues, circumstances, and
individual values and characteristics tend to be correlated with different forms
of moral reasoning.52 In addition, an increasingly substantial body of work has
examined various types of cognitive biases and self-protective mechanisms
that can influence deliberation.53
The third element is moral motivation.54 Having determined the ethically
appropriate course of action, someone then must be motivated to act upon that
conclusion. She must feel obligated to “tak[e] the moral course of action,”55
and form the intention to do so.
Cognitive dissonance can be a source of moral motivation, as a person is
moved to act in order to maintain consistency between her behavior and her

47. Sonenshein, supra note 17, at 7.
48. Id.
49. See Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 952.
50. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE
AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES 43 & tbl. 1.2 (1984).
51. See id.
52. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 956–57.
53. Id. at 958–59.
54. Id. at 954.
55. Id. at 960.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

MORAL INTUITIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

953

sense of identity.56 Emotion can play an even more important role in this
process.57 Guilt, shame, anger at injustice, and other emotions can provide the
necessary motivation to follow through on the response that one has deemed
appropriate.58 Acknowledgement of the part that emotion can play in moral
responses reflects a movement away from schools of thought that regard
emotion as antithetical to principled moral action.59
The final element in the framework is moral behavior: “the transition from
merely having moral intentions to actually engaging in moral action.”60
Individual characteristics such as the strength of a sense of personal
responsibility and the capacity for self-regulation can influence whether this
occurs.61 So can environmental factors such as perceived support for and
consequences of a course of behavior, the available pattern of rewards and
punishments, and the conduct of others in a person’s reference group.62 In
addition, unmet organizational goals can contribute to unethical behavior,
especially when individuals are just slightly short of achieving a goal.63
Research has shed light on how organizational structure and culture can
affect each of the elements in this analytical framework. It provides insights
on how we might enhance ethical awareness, improve ethical reasoning,
provide motivation to act ethically, and encourage following through on an
intention to act. This work can help identify initiatives that focus on each
separate element that forms the chain that culminates in behavior.
Current research, however, suggests that much, perhaps most, of our
ethically relevant behavior is not the result of a sequence in which these steps
occur one after the other. Rather, it is the product of a process of which we are
not consciously aware. In this process, ethical awareness, judgment,
motivation, and behavior occur virtually simultaneously. Moral reasoning, as
one scholar puts it, “is not left free to search for truth but is likely to be hired
out like a lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of
preordained conclusions.”64
People in many cases therefore are not reliable reporters of the process in
which they make moral judgments, but are unaware of that process as it is
occurring. If these operations occur outside of our consciousness, are they also
outside our control? Are most moral responses the product of a process that

56. Id. at 962–63.
57. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 964.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 965.
61. Id.
62. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 965–68.
63. Id. at 965; Maurice E. Schweitzer, Lisa Ordóñez & Bambi Douma, Goal Setting as a
Motivator of Unethical Behavior, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 422, 423 (2004).
64. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 822.
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occurs in a “black box” inaccessible to our understanding? If so, the prospects
for promoting ethical behavior, much less something as ambitious as
constructing an ethical organization culture, seem limited.
Work in a range of fields, however, has begun to explore more closely the
non-conscious moral judgment process, and to provide plausible accounts of
how it operates.65 This work has not converged on a single explanation, but it
does offer many complementary insights. These deal with the dynamics and
logic of the process, its possible evolutionary significance, and its interaction
with more self-conscious moral reasoning. As I will suggest, from this work
we also can make at least some preliminary observations about how to take this
non-conscious process into account in attempting to foster an ethical
organizational culture.
One common way to characterize the process in which we are interested is
as the operation of intuition.66 Intuitions seem suddenly just to appear in
consciousness, without prior deliberation. They represent an immediate
judgment about a situation, which often is accompanied by a particular
emotion. As Jonathan Haidt describes it, a moral intuition is “the sudden
appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative
feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of a person,
without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search,
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”67 Thus, “[w]e see an act of
violence, or hear about an act of gratitude, and we experience an instant flash
of evaluation, which may be as hard to explain as the affective response to a
face or a painting.”68 This immediate reaction may be followed by a search for
reasons to justify that judgment either to oneself or to others.69 The response
itself, however, does not involve what we conventionally regard as reasoning.
Haidt emphasizes that distinguishing between intuition and reasoning is
not the same as distinguishing between emotion and cognition. “Intuition,
reasoning, and the appraisals contained in emotions,” he maintains, “are all
forms of cognition.”70 Intuition is the form that occurs effortlessly, “such that
the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness,” while
65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
66. Not all scholars who recognize the role of non-conscious processing in producing moral
responses would necessarily frame such processing precisely specifically as the operation of
intuitions—at least insofar as that formulation suggests that perception without mental operations
serves as the immediate basis for moral judgments. For some scholars, that characterization
seems to neglect the “computational” role of the mind in employing structures to translate stimuli
into judgments that incorporate moral concepts. See, e.g., Mikhail, supra note 34, at 4 (stating
that “a simple perceptual model, such as the one implicit in Haidt’s influential model of moral
judgment, is inadequate for explaining” how moral intuitions arise).
67. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 7 (emphasis removed).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 818.
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reasoning “occurs more slowly, requires some effort, and involves at least
some steps that are accessible to consciousness.”71
Intuition collapses the four stages that I have described into one. A person
simultaneously: (1) perceives that a situation has ethical significance, (2)
arrives at a judgment about right and wrong with respect to it, (3) experiences
an emotion that motivates her to form an intention to respond in a certain way,
and (4) is moved to behave in accordance with that intention. The perception
of the situation is holistic, not analytic.
C. The Social Intuitionist Model
Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund offer a “social intuitionist” model
containing six links that purport to capture the process of non-conscious moral
judgment.72 First is intuitive judgment, which involves a close connection
between visceral reaction and conscious assessment.73 Some feature of the
situation elicits an immediate response that provokes a moral judgment.74
When, for instance, witnessing or hearing about the behavior of another, a
“flash of feeling” first occurs.75 This tends to lead to moral judgment:
conscious praise or blame of the behavior, including a belief in its rightness or
wrongness.76 “These flashes of intuition are not dumb; as with the superb
mental software that runs visual perception, they often hide a great deal of
sophisticated processing occurring behind the scenes.”77
Scott Reynolds has suggested a neurocognitive explanation of this
process.78 It begins with the claim that humans rely on both conscious and
non-conscious processing of information to make sense of their environment.79
Intuition reflects the operation of non-conscious processing, which is
associated with specific regions of the brain.80 Neurons receive a stimulus
from the environment and transmit electrochemical signals that form a neural
pattern unique to that stimulus.81 The brain then compares this pattern against
71. Id.
72. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 2.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 8.
78. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 737. Reynolds’s account builds on “connectionist” theory,
which focuses on the functions and activity of “the neuron, the fundamental unit of the brain.” Id.
at 738; see also Matthew D. Lieberman, Intuition: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach,
126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 109 (2000). See generally CASEBEER, supra note 11, at 73–125; PAUL M.
CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE SEAT OF THE SOUL: A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY
INTO THE BRAIN 123–50 (1995).
79. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 739.
80. Id. at 738.
81. Id.
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existing base patterns, or prototypes, which can represent “sounds, language,
objects, scenes, situations, concepts, and even complex social interactions.”82
Prototypes are multi-dimensional, drawing on all five senses. The
prototype of an object, for instance, can indicate the contexts in which that
object is found and the sensory stimuli associated with it, while the prototype
of a scene “could incorporate information about the season in which it occurs
or the people who usually are involved.”83 To the extent that a pattern matches
a prototype, the relevant stimuli are presented to consciousness in terms of that
prototype.84 This allows individuals to recognize elements of the environment
with minimal cognitive effort.85
Most relevant for our purposes, prototypes can include ethically significant
patterns.86 Ethical prototypes exist for situations such as bribery, fraud, sexual
harassment, lying, and the like.87 These prototypes include “normative
evaluations and prescriptive recommendations” that guide the individual’s
response to the situation.88 “For instance, a bribery prototype not only
describes what a prototypical bribery situation looks like, but also indicates
that such situations are viewed by society as ethically abhorrent and that the
ethically acceptable behavior is to deny the bribe.”89 Ethical prototypes
therefore “are dynamic constructs holding descriptive, evaluative, and
prescriptive information in one configuration of neural network signals.”90
This process constitutes a rapid form of information processing that
requires a low level of our active attention. Only when stimuli do not match
our available prototypes do we engage in a more active, conscious cognitive
process. The latter process does not just involve pattern-matching, but is
capable of using abstract rules to arrive at judgments. When we rely on it, we
are aware that we are engaged in a deliberative activity that relies on tools such
as logic and ethical theories.
The second link in Haidt and Bjorklund’s social intuitionist model is the
“[p]ost-[h]oc reasoning link.”91 They define reasoning as mental activity that
involves at least two steps that are performed consciously.92 Reason
conventionally is described as consisting of steps such as searching for relevant
82. Id. at 738.
83. Id. at 739.
84. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 739.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 739.
90. Id.
91. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 8.
92. Id. To say that it is done consciously “means that the process is intentional, effortful,
and controllable, and that the reasoner is aware that it is going on.” Haidt, The Emotional Dog
and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 818.
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evidence, weighing it, coordinating evidence with theories, and reaching a
decision.93 Social intuitionist theory argues that moral reasoning typically
occurs after a moral judgment is made and that it involves a post hoc search for
arguments to support that judgment.94 This search does not lead to the
judgment, in other words, but follows from it. As Haidt suggests, when this
occurs,
what people are searching for is not a memory of the actual cognitive
processes that caused their behaviors, because these processes are not
accessible to consciousness. Rather, people are searching for plausible
theories about why they might have done what they did. . . . The search is
95
likely to be a one-sided search of memory for supporting evidence only.

In some cases, it may be easy for us to articulate why we have judged behavior
to be right or wrong. In other cases, it may take awhile, as we search for
reasons that seem to account for our reaction. In still other cases, when
pressed for an explanation of or justification for our judgment, we may not be
able to provide a coherent one. Haidt describes this phenomenon as being
“morally dumbfounded”96 Even when presented with arguments for the
opposite side in this situation, people typically will not change their initial
position.97
Thus, “our conscious verbal reasoning is in no way the command center of
our actions; it is rather more like a press secretary, whose job is to offer
convincing explanations for whatever the person happens to do.”98 This
characterization echoes Hume’s pronouncements that “[r]eason is . . . the slave
of the passions,”99 and that morality is “more properly felt than judg’d
of . . . .”100
Support for the view that we typically use reason to support our intuitive
conclusions comes from research on motives that bias and shape reasoning.101
The first group of motives, “relatedness motives,” shapes judgments in
accordance with a desire for harmony and agreement with others.102 More
specifically, we are motivated to agree with our friends and those with whom
we expect to have some interaction.103 Haidt suggests that this makes sense

93. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 8.
94. Id.
95. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 822.
96. Id. at 817 (quoting Jonathon Haidt et al., Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No
Reason (2000) (unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia)).
97. Id.
98. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 9.
99. HUME, supra note 13, at 462.
100. Id. at 522.
101. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 820.
102. Id. at 821.
103. Id.
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from an evolutionary perspective—”it would be strange if our moral judgment
machinery was designed principally for accuracy, with no concern for the
disastrous effects of periodically siding with our enemies and against our
friends.”104
A second set of motives is “[c]oherence” motives.105 These are activated
by the desire to avoid or resolve cognitive dissonance.106 We often reason
defensively, seeking to align beliefs and behavior in an integrated and
consistent self-image.107 Furthermore, our desire to believe that we live in a
world in which people get what they deserve can lead us to express moral
judgments that confirm this belief.108
Both types of motives move us generally to seek out evidence that supports
our positions and commitments, and to minimize evidence that undermines
it.109 We may depart from this tendency in limited circumstances when we
have adequate time and reasoning ability, are motivated to be accurate, have no
prior judgment to justify, and when no situational cues trigger relatedness or
coherence motivations.110 Most of the time, however, we engage in post hoc
reasoning that “is heavily marred by the biased search only for reasons that
support one’s already-stated hypothesis.”111
The third link in the social intuitionist model is the “[r]easoned
[p]ersuasion” link.112 This link introduces the “social” element into the
model.113 “People love to talk about moral questions and violations,”
communicating their moral judgments to others in an effort to reach some
consensus on standards of conduct.114 Such a process is adaptive because it
enables individuals to coordinate their actions and to cooperate with others.115
People engaged in this process are potentially amenable to persuasion by the
arguments of others; in this respect genuine moral reasoning can occur that is
not directed simply toward justification of pre-existing judgments.116
This process of persuasion, however, does not necessarily operate through
logic. “Because moral positions always have an affective component to them,”
Haidt argues, reasoned persuasion may work “not by providing logically
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 818.
Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10. On the evolutionary benefits of cooperation, see ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS
WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF EMOTIONS (1988); RIDLEY, supra note 11.
116. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 10.
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compelling arguments but by triggering new affectively valenced intuitions in
the listener.”117 Thus, “If Saddam Hussein is Hitler, it follows that he must be
stopped. But if Iraq is Vietnam, it follows that the United States should not
become involved.”118
As long as a person is at least somewhat open to persuasion by another,
there is the chance that the two may reach a better conclusion than either could
have done on his or her own.119 While we are bad at questioning our own
assumptions and judgments, people do this for us in moral conversation.120
Thus, the social intuitionist model “gives moral reasoning a causal role in
moral judgment, but only when reasoning runs through other people.”121 This
link in the model reflects the view that “moral judgment is not just a single act
that occurs in a single person’s mind but is an ongoing process, often spread
out over time and over multiple people. Reasons and arguments can circulate
and affect people . . . .”122
The fourth, “[s]ocial [p]ersuasion,” link reflects the ways in which the
mere behavior of others, unaccompanied by dialogue, can influence our moral
judgments.123 We look to others for cues to interpret the meaning of a
situation, especially when it is ambiguous.124 As Haidt and Bjorklund describe
the basis for this process of unconscious influence,
Only human beings cooperate widely and intensely with non-kin, and we do it
in part through a set of social psychological adaptations that make us
extremely sensitive to and influenceable by what other people think and feel.
We have an intense need to belong and to fit in . . . , and our moral judgments
are strongly shaped by what others in our “parish” believe, even when they
125
don’t give us any reasons for their beliefs.

“These four links form the core of the social intuitionist model.”126 That
model posits that we typically engage in moral reasoning after our judgments
have been formed, and that we engage in that exercise in order to justify, rather
117. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 819. Haidt and
Bjorklund offer the example of someone who argues against the practice of female genital
alteration by proclaiming: “This is a clear case of child abuse. It’s a form of reverse racism not
to protect these girls from barbarous practices that rob them for a lifetime of their God-given
right to an intact body.” Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 10 (emphasis in original). Each
italicized term is an attempt to trigger a different flash of intuition in the listener. Id.
118. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 825.
119. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 11.
120. Id.
121. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 819.
122. Id. at 828.
123. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 10.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also RIDLEY, supra note 11, at 184 (stating that
imitation may constitute rational reliance on the accumulated wisdom of others).
126. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 11.
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than arrive at, those judgments.127 At the same time, however, moral reasoning
between and among people can lead to new judgments, rather than simply
confirm pre-existing ones.128 When it occurs, this process may work mainly
by triggering intuitions in others, rather than through logical persuasion.129
While the model regards these links as a description of the vast majority of
moral judgments that people make, it acknowledges that people sometimes
may change their judgments by engaging in private reasoning.130 The model
therefore includes two additional links to capture this process, which may
occur “somewhat rarely outside of highly specialized subcultures such as that
of philosophy, which provides years of training in unnatural modes of human
thought.”131
Link five is “[r]easoned [j]udgment.”132 In this case, a person uses logic to
override her initial intuition and arrive at a different conclusion.133 People may
attempt, for instance, to arrive at moral judgments by reasoning from first
principles.134 These judgments meet with great resistance, however, if they
conflict with strong moral intuitions.135 The process of reasoned judgment
may operate mainly when an initial intuition is weak and a person’s moral
reasoning capabilities are high.136
The sixth link consists of “[p]rivate [r]eflection.”137 In the course of
deliberating on a situation, a person may trigger a new intuition that contradicts
an original intuitive judgment.138 Role-playing can be an effective method of
activating new intuitions; “[s]imply by putting yourself into the shoes of
another person you may instantly feel pain, sympathy, or other vicarious
emotional responses.”139 A person may choose which intuition to honor by
applying a rule or principle.140 Perhaps more commonly, someone may choose
the intuition that seems strongest and most apt; “ultimately the person decides
on a feeling of rightness, rather than a deduction of some kind.”141
An emerging body of research thus suggests that our default method of
perceiving ethical issues and making ethical judgments may be non-conscious
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–12.
Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 13.
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information processing that generates intuitions. Only when patterns of stimuli
do not match our available prototypes does more deliberate self-conscious
reasoning swing into action.
Some scholars have recently has suggested that, in some circumstances,
moral reasoning may play a more influential role in producing moral
judgments than social intuitionists claim—that reasoning is not limited mostly
to justifying judgments after they have been made.142 Joshua Greene and
colleagues, for instance, argue for a “synthetic theory of moral judgment,” in
which both emotional intuitions and abstract reasoning can play a role in
different circumstances.143 This model “stand[s] in tension with the social
intuitionist claim that in nearly all cases moral judgments are more akin to
perception than episodes of reasoning or reflection.”144 At the same time, they
acknowledge that a focus on the role of intuitions represents an important
corrective to traditional conceptions of moral judgment that define it solely in
terms of cognition untainted by emotion.145
Cordelia Fine points to studies that indicate that in some instances, certain
factors may disrupt the connection between intuition and judgment in people
who tend to evaluate others on the basis of stereotypes.146 The desire to be
accurate, some dependence on the person being judged, and the belief that
stereotyping is unacceptable all can inhibit the activation and application of
stereotypes.147
Experiments indicate that resistance to stereotyping in such instances
requires a more than minimal amount of “attentional resources,” which
suggests the operation of controlled, effortful moral reasoning prior to the
formation of a judgment.148 Personal motivations and values therefore may
prompt the use of more involved deliberation that prevents or limits the
operation of automatic responses.149
If such factors can provide the opportunity for moral reasoning to play a
causal role in judgments, it is possible that even intuitive reactions may
represent the product of prior moral reasoning that has become
“automatized.”150 Reasoning may be informed by personal aspirations or
142. Fine, supra note 38; David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom, The Intelligence of Moral
Intuitions: Comment on Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003).
143. Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389, 397 (2004).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 389, 396–97.
146. Fine, supra note 38. For an account of the way in which such stereotyping can occur
rapidly and non-consciously, see Dolly Chugh, Societal and Managerial Implications of Implicit
Social Cognition: Why Milliseconds Matter, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 203 (2004).
147. Fine, supra note 38, at 87.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 95.
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commitments to certain values that motivate someone to make the cognitive
effort required to resist the influence of automatic non-conscious reactions.151
To the extent that judgment and behavior is habitually shaped by these
aspirations or commitments, they may eventually become sufficiently durable
that they are triggered by the non-conscious processing that generates
intuitions.
This account seems plausible. Think, for instance, of sexual harassment in
the workplace. A generation ago, certain behaviors of men toward women that
we now think of as offensive were regarded by many as unexceptional and
perhaps inevitable. Such behavior triggered little awareness of harm, and
minimal moral disapproval. In the intervening years, however, there has been
a self-conscious effort to illuminate the injuries both to psyche and career that
women can suffer because of certain sexually-charged behavior. We may now
be moving toward a point when such behavior triggers an immediate reaction
of disapproval and disgust. In other words, we may be approaching the point
at which certain conduct elicits distinct moral intuitions. Those intuitions
simultaneously shape our perception—we now “see” sexual harassment where
we did not before—as well as our evaluation of what we perceive.
In this way, the campaign to raise awareness of the various behavioral
forms that sexual harassment can take may reflect the generation of a new
moral prototype. It began with an effort at reasoned persuasion. That effort
undoubtedly sought to trigger existing intuitions. It also, however, appealed at
least in part to the conscious and deliberate information processing system that
relies on logic and principles, such as the notion of equality. There followed a
stage in which people whose consciousness was evolving on the issue
deliberately and self-consciously began to categorize certain behavior as
harassment. This would involve, for instance, the disruption of otherwise
automatic tolerant reactions to such behavior. The most durable foundation for
behavior change, however, will come when people automatically characterize
conduct as harassment without an intervening self-conscious step.
If this story is right, it suggests that intuitions are not necessarily
irreducible intractable phenomena, but may be amenable to deliberate revision
and construction in some cases. Fine suggests that this may occur when “the
individual is motivated to form accurate judgments, and has the attentional
resources available to do so.”152 We can accept this amendment to the social
intuitionist model while still acknowledging that moral judgments may be the
product of automatic intuitions far more than most people realize.153

151. Id. at 94–95.
152. Fine, supra note 38, at 97.
153. Indeed, Haidt would agree with Fine to a certain extent: “The reasoning process in moral
judgment may be capable of working objectively under very limited circumstances: when the
person has adequate time and processing capacity, a motivation to be accurate, no a priori
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In sum, research indicates that, despite their non-conscious origins, we
need not regard moral intuitions as beyond our understanding or influence.
The reasoned persuasion link of Haidt’s social intuitionist model provides a
role for dialogue in subjecting intuitions to scrutiny and leaving us open to the
possibility of changing our moral judgments. He believes that such dialogue is
most likely to have this effect when one person is able to trigger alternative
intuitions in another, but he also acknowledges the possibility that appeals to
logic may be influential in some cases.154
Furthermore, Fine suggests that intuitions themselves may be the product
of previous conscious processes that relied on deliberate reasoning, whose
outcomes eventually are expressed in automatic reactions.155 People may be
motivated to engage in such reasoning rather than be guided by intuitions if
they aspire to moral responses that are more consistent with the values to
which they subscribe.156 Other motivations also may make people willing to
activate a conscious process of moral judgment.157 If a person has the
opportunity to muster the cognitive resources to engage in this activity, her
moral responses will result from deliberate moral reasoning.
What are the implications of this model for organizational culture? As
Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds suggest, “[I]t seems unlikely that moral
intuitions specifically about some of the ethical issues that occur in complex
organizations are all, or entirely, formed during early periods of life. Thus,
researchers might ask whether and how the social context of organizational life
influences moral intuition.”158 What, if any, link might there be between the
operation of moral intuitions and the behavior of people within organizations?
There has been little sustained attention to this question thus far. Treviño,
Weaver, and Reynolds, for instance, opine that it would be useful to explore
whether “social learning processes (e.g., behavior modeling by others at work),
or successful opportunities for moral behavior, build up a repertoire of
affectively supported moral intuitions[.]”159 Reynolds suggests that in some
cases, managers may have “deeply engrained prototypes” about moral
dilemmas that do not reflect what the organization regards as appropriate.160 In
these instances, he argues, organizations may want to use role-playing and
small group discussions to “draw [prototypes] out of nonconscious processing”

judgment to defend or justify, and when no relatedness or coherence motivations are triggered.”
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 822.
154. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 10–12.
155. Fine, supra note 38, at 86–87.
156. Id. at 87.
157. Id.
158. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 961.
159. Id.
160. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745.
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so that they can be critically evaluated.161 In addition, organizations will need
to provide new prototypes for newly emerging ethical situations, and expose
managers to them regularly.162 Finally, organizations should make available
general rules or guidelines that can guide managers’ decision-making when
they rely on more conscious deliberative reasoning.163
In the next section, I will suggest how the work on moral intuitions might
inform efforts to promote an ethical culture within an organization. I will not
offer specific programs or techniques; my focus instead will be on the general
form that such efforts might take.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING
A.

The Power of Prototypes

Several features of modern organizational life that seem relevant to the
work on moral intuitions are the accelerating pace and scope of business
operations, the frequency with which people confront novel situations, and the
need for rapid decision-making. As Scott Sonenshein observes, “Several
accounts portray managerial work as one in which quick reactions are needed,
and where managers use experience, such as pattern-matching to a pre-existing
category.”164 This suggests that it may be difficult regularly to make available
the amount of attentional resources necessary to use deliberate reasoning to
shape judgment and behavior. The mental process instead resembles nonconscious neurocognitive operations in which a person compares patterns of
stimuli with pre-existing prototypes and activates conscious processes only
when there is no match between them. This “[l]ow effort cognitive
system[]”165 seems suited for dealing with the barrage of stimuli that managers
receive.
Scott Reynolds underscores that “[t]he business environment changes
quickly, and managers often operate in new contexts where norms have yet to
be established and therefore prototypes are scarce.”166 He suggests, however,
that the result is that managers need regularly to “rely on their higher order
conscious reasoning skills.”167 This seems right insofar as it recognizes that
managers may not have moral prototypes readily accessible in novel situations,
and that inducing moral responses in such situations requires stimulating
deliberate moral reasoning.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sonenshein, supra note 17, at 23 (citations omitted).
Id.
Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745; see also Chugh, supra note 146.
Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745.
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Managers are likely, however, to have non-moral prototypes available for
use in these situations that emphasize practical business considerations.
Research indicates that the default perceptual framework that people use in the
work setting is less likely to include moral concerns than the one that they use
outside of work.168 Other research indicates that experienced managers are
less likely to frame a situation in moral terms than are less experienced ones.169
The reason is that “experienced business practitioners are more likely to
possess well-developed business-schemas and therefore to be primed by their
environment to pay attention to the strategic, rather than the moral,
components of the environment.”170 Thus, absent the kind of disruption of the
link between intuitions and judgments that Fine describes,171 managers may
often fail to perceive the moral dimensions of novel situations in which they
need to make rapid decisions. Their intuitive responses, in other words, may
contain no moral component, because the prototypes that are the foundation of
these intuitions fail to do so.
The decreasing amount of attentional resources that seem to be available to
managers suggests that triggering new intuitions may be a more promising way
to increase moral awareness than attempting to activate conscious moral
reasoning. While both may be necessary, the first may be more important. If
this is right, it directs attention to the prototypes that are crucial in generating
intuitions.172 How and why do prototypes come into existence? More
specifically for our purposes, what kinds of opportunities might there be to
prompt reliance on moral prototypes in the modern organizational setting? As
Reynolds argues, “The more the organization can infuse managers with
prototypes of ethical behavior, the more reflexive pattern matching will
override the system and automatically lead to ethical outcomes.”173
Reynolds describes moral prototypes as “initially defined by the five
senses with information about the observable qualities of the situation,” but as
distinguished from other prototypes in that they include “normative evaluations
and prescriptive recommendations.”174 Moral prototypes thus seem to be
mental representations of common scenarios that have moral significance,
168. See, e.g., Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Dennis L. Krebs, Situational Variation in Moral
Judgment: In a Stage or On a Stage?, 21 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 203 (1992).
169. See Jennifer Jordan, Business Experience and Moral Awareness: When Less May Be
More 38 (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, Social Science Research Network, Working
Paper No. 26, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=845827.
170. Id. at 14; see also Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of
Missed Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379 (1992).
171. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
172. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 742. “Prototypes are the central component of the reflexive
pattern matching cycle, and given that so many ethical decisions are the result of this cycle, their
importance cannot be overstated.” Id.
173. Id. at 745.
174. Id. at 739.
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which require that we make distinctive kinds of judgments. One way to gain
insight into their operation therefore is to ask, “Why do people make any kind
of moral judgment?”175 The literature that responds to this question is, of
course, vast, and I am in no position to offer anything close to an overall
assessment of it. Instead, I want to describe one school of thought that is
consistent with the intuitionist model, which may help identify prototypes
especially relevant to the organizational environment.
B.

Morality and Cooperation

A “pragmatic” approach to moral judgment focuses on the functions and
purposes that morality serves for human beings.176 It urges us to “view moral
judgments and moral behaviors not as end products of moral reasoning, but,
rather, as means to ends, as tools that people use to accomplish tasks and
achieve results.”177 In particular, what kind of evolutionary advantage might
accrue to beings who engage in moral evaluation? How is morality an
adaptive activity in the process of human evolution?
A common answer to these questions that seems especially relevant to the
organizational setting is that moral judgments help to promote and reinforce
the cooperative behavior necessary for humans to survive and flourish.178 As
Matt Ridley has suggested:
We are, misanthropes notwithstanding, unable to live without each other.
Even on a practical level, it is probably a million years since any human being
was entirely and convincingly self-sufficient: able to survive without trading

175. Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton, Toward a More Pragmatic Approach to Morality: A
Critical Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Model, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 629 (2005); see also Dennis L.
Krebs et al., The Forms and Functions of Real-Life Moral Decision-Making, 26 J. MORAL EDUC.
131 (1997).
176. Krebs & Denton, supra note 175, at 639.
177. Id. at 639.
178. See id. at 641. Krebs and Denton argue, “The codes of conduct, rules, norms, and forms
of conduct that uphold systems of cooperation define the domain of morality and the moral orders
of societies.” Id. at 641. We need not assume, however, that the realm of potentially cooperative
relations is the only distinctly moral domain. Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, for instance,
argue that there are five foundations of intuitive moral judgments, which deal with issues
surrounding: (1) harm and care, (2) fairness and reciprocity, (3) ingroup identity and loyalty, (4)
authority and respect, and (5) purity and sanctity. Haidt & Joseph, The Moral Mind, supra note
34, at 16. Their second category seems to correspond most directly with a concern for
cooperation, although issues that arise in all domains other than perhaps purity and sanctity also
could have implications for the possibility of cooperation. See id.
Richard Shweder and his colleagues maintain that there are three major domains of
morality, relating to autonomy, community, and divinity. Richard A. Shweder et al., The “Big
Three” of Morality (Autonomy, Community, and Divinity) and the “Big Three” Explanations of
Suffering, in MORALITY AND HEALTH 119 (Allan M. Brandt & Paul Rozin eds., 1997).
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his skills for those of his fellow humans. We are far more dependent on other
179
members of our species than any other ape or monkey.

Similarly, Adam Smith noted, “In almost every other race of animals each
individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its
natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But
man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren . . . .”180
This set of conditions tends to favor those with dispositions to cooperate
and to uphold cooperative arrangements. As Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin
maintain:
Throughout our recent evolutionary history . . . there must have been extreme
selective pressures in favor of our ability to cooperate as a group . . . . The
degree of selective pressure toward cooperation . . . was so strong, and the
period over which it operated so extended . . . that it can hardly have failed to
181
become embedded to some degree in our genetic makeup.

Certain emotional responses reflect this evolved disposition. These emotions
express moral judgments that people use “to induce themselves and others to
cooperate and resist the temptation to cheat.”182 Joshua Greene suggests that
our tendency to engage in rapid moral evaluations may reflect the influence of
evolution: “We have evolved mechanisms for making quick, emotion-based
social judgments,” he says, “for ‘seeing’ rightness and wrongness, because our
intensely social lives favour such capacities.”183
Every system of cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation by those who
participate in it. Individuals may capitalize on others’ long-term commitments
and on delayed or indirect forms of exchange to take more than their share of

179. RIDLEY, supra note 11, at 6; see also CASEBEER, supra note 11, at 136 (“Owing to the
facts of our evolutionary history, sociability and cooperative engagement with the world are both
ends in themselves and a means of achieving just about eny other important end we care to
mention.”).
180. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 7 (William Benton Pub. 1952) (1877).
181. RICHARD E. LEAKEY & ROGER LEWIN, ORIGINS: WHAT NEW DISCOVERIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE EMERGENCE OF OUR SPECIES AND ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE 223 (1977); see also Krebs
& Denton, supra note 175, at 641 (discussing how “humans are disposed to practice ‘strong
reciprocity,’” which is “a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate
the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs
will be repaid”) (quoting Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 153, 153 (2003).
182. Krebs & Denton, supra note 175, at 641.
183. Greene, supra note 34, at 849. Haidt maintains that the social intuitionist model
proposes that morality, like language, is a major evolutionary adaptation for an intensely
social species, built into multiple regions of the brain and body, that is better described as
emergent than as learned yet that requires input and shaping from a particular culture.
Moral intuitions are therefore both innate and enculturated.
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 826.
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benefits without reciprocating. Moral norms arise in order to minimize this
danger, thereby preserving the viability of cooperation as an adaptive strategy.
Feelings of reciprocity, gratitude, sympathy, obligation, and admiration can
reinforce cooperative bonds, while feelings of indignation, guilt, and injustice
can serve as mechanisms to detect and punish selfish exploitation of
cooperative ties. These may move us not simply to cooperate, but to attempt to
induce others to do so, and to sanction those who do not. Moral norms and the
emotions they evoke thus seek to ensure that “morality and emotional habits
pay,” by fostering a value system in which “[t]he more you behave in selfless
and generous ways the more you can reap the benefits of cooperative endeavor
from society. You get more from life if you irrationally forgo opportunism.”184
On this view, moral judgment is activated by issues involving “social
exchange, giving and taking, rights and duties, conflicts of interest, and
violations of the principles and rules that uphold cooperative relations.”185
Krebs and Denton maintain that the occasions on which this occurs involve
certain characteristic dilemmas. People confront “temptation dilemmas” when
they are tempted to pursue their own interests at the expense of others, and
“social pressure dilemmas” when they attempt to persuade others to behave in
ways that help them achieve their goals.186 They face dilemmas involving
conflicting demands and the needs of others when they must decide what they
owe others and what they can claim for themselves.187 Finally, they must deal
with “transgression dilemmas” when they decide whether to use moral
judgments to impose sanctions against those who violate moral norms.188
Conceptualizing moral judgment in this way implies that “different social
contexts are guided by different systems of cooperation, moral orders, or forms
of sociality, . . . which are upheld by different types of moral judgment.”189
Cooperative arrangements vary in the immediacy of the personal relationships
that they contain. Some involve hierarchical relationships of obedience to
those in “higher” positions, coupled with a right to receive their care; some
feature literal exchange; still others represent systems of reciprocity based on
gratitude and mutual expectations.190 Increasing in abstraction, the social order
itself can be seen as a cooperative arrangement maintained by a sense of

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

RIDLEY, supra note 11, at 141.
Krebs & Denton, supra note 175, at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Dennis L. Krebs et al., Structural Flexibility of Moral Judgment, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1012 (1991).
190. For one typology of forms of cooperation, see Alan Page Fiske, The Four Elementary
Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689
(1992).
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mutual obligation, and ultimately by the agreement of free and equal
individuals.
These social structures correspond to the stages of moral reasoning that
Kohlberg argued reflect gradually increasing moral maturity.191 In his
formulation, one stage displaces another as a person matures.192 Krebs and
Denton argue, however, that society contains a mixture of different forms of
cooperation, and that each form of reasoning is appropriate to a particular
form.193 As people mature, they ideally acquire a more comprehensive
understanding of the ties that underlie all forms of cooperation in their
societies.194 This allows them to appreciate increasingly more remote and
abstract structures of cooperation.195
The ability to draw on this understanding when engaged in moral
reasoning, however, does not mean this reasoning style replaces all others.
Rather, people retain the flexibility to invoke the type of moral judgments
appropriate to the cooperative arrangement in question.196 Cooperation based
on a hierarchical structure of paternalism, for instance, may properly elicit
moral evaluations that rely on notions of obedience, vulnerability, and care,
while cooperation resting on a specialized division of labor may prompt moral
judgments invoking norms that speak to contribution, reliance, and
opportunism.
This account of moral judgments suggests that moral prototypes are
especially likely to emerge in contexts in which our ability to cooperate is at
issue. Highlighting the effect of certain behavior on possibilities for
cooperation thus may be an important step in both triggering existing
prototypes and generating new ones. Even if fostering cooperation is but one
of the functions of moral judgments, it is a function that may have particular
relevance in the organizational setting.
An organization, of course, is one example of a cooperative human
enterprise. It therefore is a setting in which people are engaged in efforts to
coordinate their actions with others in order to achieve together what no
individual could alone. This means that members of organizations must decide
how much to forgo immediate personal advantage for the sake of the larger
group, the extent to which they are willing to make contributions that are not
immediately reciprocated, whether other people should be sanctioned for
exploiting cooperation for selfish gain, and myriad other questions that raise
issues of trust, commitment, altruism, selfishness, opportunism, loyalty,

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Krebs & Denton, supra note 175, at 630–31.
Id.
Id. at 639–43.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Krebs & Denton, supra note 175, at 633.
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betrayal, and sacrifice that we think of as moral. An organization thus would
seem to be an important arena for the elicitation of moral prototypes.
Consider once again my example of the potential emergence of a prototype
of sexual harassment in the workplace. Over the past generation, increasing
numbers of women have entered the paid labor force. As they have come to
participate more in organizational forms of cooperation, it has become clearer
that certain behaviors of men toward women that have been unreflectively
accepted jeopardize the ability to work cooperatively together. This behavior
increasingly elicits moral condemnation. That is not to say that these
condemnations rest purely on functional grounds, as opposed to recognition of
the equal dignity of women and men. The occasion for vindicating equal
dignity in this setting, however, may have arisen as a result of how this form of
cooperation has evolved.
C. Triggering Intuitions: Legal Compliance Programs
What might all this mean for the role of moral intuition in promoting
ethical behavior and fostering an ethical culture within organizations? It
suggests that people in organizations may be especially receptive to appeals
that animate dispositions to build and sustain cooperative relationships. I want
first to discuss how prompting these dispositions may elicit intuitions that we
think of as morally salutary. When this occurs, members of an organization
may respond with altruism, sacrifice, and self-restraint that enhances group
solidarity and commitment. At the same time, there is a risk that a strong sense
of group identity will trigger other intuitions that make members more willing
to ignore or even disadvantage those who are not members of the group. I
therefore will discuss how an organization might try to minimize the influence
of these intuitions. From this perspective, the challenge for an organization is
how selectively to elicit and inhibit distinct sets of moral intuitions.
Focusing first on desirable intuitions, these are more likely to come into
play the more people regard the organization as a cooperative venture and are
sensitive to how different behavior is likely to sustain or jeopardize it. The
challenge in a large organization is that the consequences and nature of much
behavior can seem remote from the vivid, perhaps primal, scenarios that
inform the moral prototypes associated with cooperative relationships.
Organizations therefore need to give considerable thought to what kinds of
policies and practice can serve as the kind of “custom complexes”197 that both
trigger appropriate moral intuitions and generate new ones.
Research on the relative effectiveness of different types of legal
compliance programs suggests one way in which an organization can highlight
its character as a cooperative enterprise, and thus potentially activate moral
prototypes. This work distinguishes between programs based solely on
197. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 828.
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promulgation and enforcement of rules and those that include what has been
described as a values-based component.198 These orientations are not mutually
exclusive, and organizations may differ in the extent to which they emphasize
one or the other.199 They are, however, associated with somewhat different
motivations and behaviors.200
A program that focuses on compliance with rules, and on imposing
penalties for violating them, tends to emphasize deterrence.201 It sets forth
fairly specific prescriptions designed to minimize discretion and regularize
behavior.202 The program puts in place monitoring and audit systems to
prevent, detect, report, and punish improper behavior.203
What is called a “values-oriented” component of a compliance program
has a broader focus.204 It emphasizes the values to which the organization is
committed, encouraging employees to identify with and act on the basis of
those values.205 While there are penalties for acting inconsistently with the
values, the organization assumes that people aspire to behave consistently with
them and emphasizes that they necessarily will have to exercise some
discretion in deciding how to do so.206
Research has measured the impact of deterrence-oriented and valuesoriented features of a compliance program on different types of ethically
significant behavior. Deterrence-oriented features have a positive relationship
to: (1) lower observed unethical conduct by others, (2) willingness to seek
ethical advice, (3) awareness of ethical issues, and (4) perception of better
decision-making.207 Values-oriented features have an even greater positive
relationship to these outcomes. They also have a positive relationship with
additional outcomes that deterrence features do not: (1) commitment to the
organization, (2) feeling of integrity in that values and behavior at work
consistent with those outside of work, and (3) willingness to deliver bad
news.208 Finally, neither kind of orientation alone has a positive effect on the
willingness to report unethical behavior, but employees more likely to report

198. See TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 191–230; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky
Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1970–82 (2006).
199. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 193.
200. Id. at 194.
201. See id. at 193.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 193; Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for
Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 111 (1994).
205. Paine, supra note 204, at 111.
206. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 193; see also Paine, supra note 204, at 111.
207. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 205–08.
208. Id. at 208.
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such behavior if they perceived a combined values- and deterrence-based
orientation.209
A perceived values orientation thus “appears to add distinctive and
desirable outcomes that are not achieved by a focus on behavioral
compliance.”210 A compliance system that has only deterrence features can
produce ethical behavior, but its impact will be stronger if it accompanied by
values-based features. A clue to why this is so is the fact that values-based
features are correlated with commitment to the organization and a sense of
individual integrity, while deterrence-based features are not.211 This suggests
that values and deterrence orientations tap into different types of motivation for
compliance.212
A values orientation prompts ethical behavior because the individual
identifies with the organization’s commitment to ethics and sees it as valuable
for its own sake.213 Ethical behavior in organizations with this orientation
reflects people’s sense that the organization’s values are consistent with their
own.214 Another way to describe this is that the employee sees herself as part
of a cooperative venture that is attempting to serve purposes with which she
identifies. A values-based orientation sends a “message of trust and
support,”215 which enhances willingness to contribute to this collective
enterprise. This identification with and support for the organization as a
cooperative arrangement is an especially durable motivation for ethical
behavior.
By contrast, a deterrence program prompts ethical behavior because a
person follows rules to avoid sanctions.216 A program that emphasizes rulefollowing provides only minimal support for regarding the organization as a
scheme of cooperation.217 The organization is more likely to be perceived as
an external force that seeks to impose regulations on behavior because
cooperation is scarce.218
The relative emphasis on different features of a legal compliance program
thus may underscore or minimize the character of an organization as a scheme
of cooperation, thereby eliciting or inhibiting moral prototypes associated with
cooperative activity. The greater ethical behavior prompted by values-based
program features may reflect the role of these prototypes in triggering moral

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200.
TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 200.
Id. at 200–01.
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intuitions. When an individual identifies with an organization, she sees it as a
vehicle for realizing personal values through cooperation with others.219 As a
result, she will be more attentive to the ways in which her behavior may
support or undermine this cooperative venture.220 By contrast, a compliance
program based solely on deterrence may implicitly send the message that the
pursuit of self-interest is the dominant behavior within the organization.221
This means that the program is unlikely to trigger the type of prototypes and
intuitions that provide an especially durable basis for ethical behavior.
There is some support for this “signaling” effect of compliance programs
from experiments by Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick that measure the
effect of differing levels of sanctions on willingness to cooperate in
organizational contexts.222 When sanctions are strong, people are more likely
to cooperate than when sanctions are weak.223 When there are no sanctions at
all, however, people are also more likely to cooperate than when sanctions are
weak.224
Why should there be there be less cooperation with weak sanctions than
with no sanctions at all? Tensbrunsel and Messick suggest that the presence of
sanctions—that is, deterrence features—can incline people to use what they
call a business frame.225 People who use this frame decide how to behave in a
situation based on a pragmatic calculation of costs and benefits.226 This
contrasts with the use of an ethical frame, in which people generally do not
engage in such calculation.227 Instead, they tend to make judgments about
inherent rightness or wrongness when deciding what to do.228 One might say,
in other words, that each frame elicits a distinct set of prototypes that guide
judgment and behavior.229 “[A] weak sanctioning system,” they conclude,
“prompts a perception that the decision concerns the costs versus the benefits
of cooperating, whereas the lack of such a system prompts relatively more
consideration of the ethical aspects of the decision.”230
Thus, when the presence of sanctions triggers a business frame, and
sanctions are strong, an individual will behave ethically because a cost-benefit
analysis indicates that is the best thing to do. When the presence of sanctions
219. Id. at 197.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 200.
222. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames,
and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684 (1999).
223. Id. at 700.
224. Id. at 694–98.
225. Id. at 697.
226. Id.
227. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 222, at 697.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 698.
230. Id. at 697.
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triggers a business frame, and sanctions are weak, there is a greater chance that
an individual will behave unethically, because a cost-benefit analysis is more
likely to indicate that is the best course of action. If sanctions are not
mentioned, at least some people who are asked to respond to cooperative
dilemmas will use an ethical frame. Their behavior is not affected by a costbenefit analysis, which means that their motivation is different from someone
who uses a business frame. As Tenbrunsel and Messick conclude:
the relationship between sanctioning systems and cooperation rates can be
explained by the decision frame that is adopted. . . . [T]his finding indicates
that the sanctioning system acts as a situational cue that triggers an assessment
of the type of decision that one is making (i.e., ethical or business), which in
turn influences cooperation rates. Thus, the sanctioning system influences the
231
frame, but it is the frame that determines the behavior.

An account of moral prototypes as animated by concerns related to
cooperation seems consistent with this dynamic. A business frame appears not
to activate such prototypes because it depicts the situation as a competitive one
in which concern for individual payoffs should be the dominant strategy.232
Cooperation will be contingent and unstable, depending on whether it is “the
more profitable business strategy” in a given instance.233 An ethical frame, on
the other hand, seems to lead an individual to construct the situation as one
marked by cooperation, thereby triggering moral prototypes and intuitions that
support the notion that cooperation “is the ethical action to take.”234 For this
reason, cooperation is the dominant strategy.235
Virtually any program, of course, needs to have sanctions available to
penalize wrongdoers. If the dominant thrust of the program is values-based,
however, those sanctions need not prompt the use of a business frame. Rather,
sanctions are likely to be regarded as a means of reinforcing a cooperative
scheme by ensuring that individuals do not exploit the willingness of others to
cooperate. As Treviño and Weaver observe:
The values orientation may frame the way employees understand the purpose
of compliance activities. When a values orientation is strong, compliance
activities can be perceived as part of an overall system of support for ethical
behavior. Without a strong values orientation, however, compliance activities

231. Id. at 697–98.
232. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 222, at 697.
233. Id. at 700.
234. Id.
235. Id. For other accounts of the influence of decision frames, see Bruno S. Frey & Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation CrowdingOut, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997); David M. Messick, Alternative Logics for Decision Making
in Social Settings, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 11 (1998).
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might be perceived to be part of a system aimed only at detecting
236
misconduct.

D. Triggering Intuitions: Procedural Justice
A crucial element of any effort to promote a cooperative values-based
culture is members’ belief that the organization treats them fairly. The work of
Tom Tyler and his colleagues indicates that people are more likely to commit
to an organization if they perceive it as embodying procedural justice.237
Factors contributing to this perception include whether procedures permit
members to participate in decision-making processes, whether they require that
objective information be used in those processes, and whether there are efforts
to minimize bias.238 Even if individuals do not always obtain what they want
from the organization, they will maintain allegiance to it if they believe that
decisions are made through a fair process.239 This allegiance in turn can
motivate ethical behavior.240 As a result, “an organizational environment
characterized by fair procedures will activate strong employee organizational
identification, thus leading employees to engage in desirable workplace
behaviors and to hold positive attitudes towards their work organizations.”241
Specifically, Tyler argues that the perception of procedural justice is likely
to trigger ethical behavior based on a “self-regulatory” rather than “command
and control” model.242 These models roughly correspond to values-based and
deterrence-based approaches to compliance.243 The command-and-control
model “links employees’ motivation to follow rules to the manipulation of
sanctions in the work place,” and is “based on the view that people follow rules
as a function of the costs and benefits they associate with doing so.”244 By
contrast, a self-regulatory model “is based on the activation of internal
motivations.”245 It “emphasizes the role that employees’ ethical values play in
motivating rule following and, in particular, those ethical values that are
236. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 212. “Discipline for rule violators serves an
important symbolic role in organizations—it reinforces standards, upholds the value of
conformity to shared norms, and maintains the perception that the organization is a just place
where wrongdoers are held accountable for their actions.” Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing
Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 139
(1999).
237. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work
Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2005).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1303; see also TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 267–92.
242. Tyler, supra note 237, at 1303.
243. Id. at 1287–90.
244. Id. at 1290.
245. Id.
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related to—and developed in the course of their interactions with—their work
organization.”246
Tyler’s research concludes that a self-regulatory approach is more effective
in promoting ethical behavior because “employees take on the responsibility to
follow rules and undertake this responsibility without being concerned with the
likelihood of being caught and punished for wrongdoing.”247 They identify
with the organization, and are motivated to follow its policies, because they see
those policies as furthering values that are consistent with their own.248 “By
activating employees’ own ethical values,” Tyler maintains, “companies can
gain willing cooperation from their employees. By having people regulate
themselves, such willing cooperation becomes much more efficient and
effective.”249
This description of the role that fair procedures play in animating
identification with an organization and voluntary compliance with its policies
is consistent with the idea that moral intuitions are elicited by issues related to
cooperation. Tyler and Blader’s “group engagement” model posits that groups
play an important role in helping individuals construct an identity and sense of
worth.250 “The central reason that people engage themselves in groups,” they
argue, “is because they use the feedback they receive from those groups to
create and maintain their identities.”251 Such feedback includes information on
both the social status of the group, which can engender a sense of pride, and
the status of the individual within it, which can communicate a feeling of being
respected. When people receive information from the group that generates
feelings of pride and respect, they are motivated to merge their sense of self
with that of the group.
Tyler and Blader maintain that information about procedural fairness
within an organization is the most relevant information available to people in
determining whether to identify with the organization.252 They argue that
procedural justice provides a sense of “identity security” for the individual.253
While identifying with an organization can be rewarding, it also carries risks.
Hostile, uncooperative, or even indifferent behavior toward an individual by
others in the organization can damage her sense of self-worth. Anyone who
cooperates with others is vulnerable to exploitation by them. Individuals

246. Id.
247. Tyler, supra note 237, at 1302.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1301–02.
250. Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice,
Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 353
(2003).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 358.
253. Id.
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therefore must “balance the potential identity gains associated with merging
their identities with a group against the potential risks of that same merger of
the self and the group.”254
To the degree that people believe that the group follows fair procedures in
making decisions, they are more likely to feel that they can safely merger their
identity with the group.255 Two components of procedural justice help provide
this reassurance. First, fair decision-making processes indicate that decisions
will be made by a neutral decision-maker who will consistently apply objective
rules, rather than act on the basis of prejudice, stereotypes, or self-interest.256
Second, treating people with dignity and politeness, taking into account their
needs and concerns, communicates that the organization values the individuals
who comprise it.257 This provides assurance that people “will receive
treatment that affirms their status well into the future of their group
membership.”258
Another way to describe this is that an organization characterized by
procedural justice signals to its members that the organization can be a safe
vehicle for gaining the benefits of cooperation with others. If members
identify with the organization and see themselves as participants in a
cooperative enterprise, they should be particularly sensitive to how different
types of behavior can reinforce or undermine cooperation. Situations in which
behavior potentially has this effect should be especially likely to elicit moral
prototypes and trigger moral intuitions.
The behavior most immediately salient to this process likely will be
behavior toward the organization itself. Thus, in an organization with which
members identify, we would expect a relatively low incidence of, for instance,
diversion of organizational resources for personal gain, as occurred in
companies like Tyco and Adelphia. If an individual is primed to recognize the
implications of behavior for the success of cooperation, it takes minimal
imagination to appreciate that stealing from a cooperative venture weakens that
venture’s viability.
Sensitivity to the impact of her actions on the organization may also
prompt an employee to develop a more expansive sense of responsibility for
behavior that affects parties outside the organization. Behavior that harms
stakeholders can also injure the organization, as a result of legal penalties,
public criticism, consumer boycotts, and the like. This can threaten the success
of the scheme of cooperation that the entity represents. The desire to avoid
254. Id. at 358.
255. “When organizational procedures are regarded as fair, employees feel that they can
safely identify with the work organization and thus become engaged in it.” Tyler, supra note
237, at 1305 (citation omitted).
256. Tyler & Blader, supra note 250, at 359.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 358–59.
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letting down other participants in this scheme may provide motivation for
taking the interests of stakeholders into account.
This is not to say that appeals to be sensitive to stakeholder interests should
focus only on this rationale, eschewing efforts to cultivate a wider sense of
civic responsibility. Those efforts also can rely on appeals to interdependence,
and on the idea of society as an even larger cooperative effort that can be
unraveled by certain behavior. The more immediate and palpable experience
of life within the organization, however, may make organizational
identification an especially powerful force in motivating responsible social
behavior. People generally tend to respond more sympathetically in situations
in which they think of moral demands as more immediate and personal than
those in which they regard such demands as remote and impersonal.259 The
former appear to trigger more intensive emotional reactions than the latter.260
Engagement in more deliberate moral reasoning may counteract this tendency,
but it seems to be a powerful one that we need to take into account.261 Perhaps
we can capitalize on it to promote more pro-social behavior based on concern
for the organization, while using this as an intermediate toward inculcating a
more expansive conception of social interdependence.
The importance of procedural justice thus suggests that if an organization
wants to foster a culture in which people act socially responsible and in ethical
ways, one place to start may be to establish and sustain procedural justice
within the organization.262 “To most employees, ethics means how the
organization treats them and their coworkers.”263 When members or
employees think of “ethics,” their initial focus is not necessarily on conduct
covered by a company’s ethics or legal compliance program.264 Rather, it is
259. See Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in
INNATENESS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND (Stephen Laurence, Peter Carruthers & Stephen
Stich eds., forthcoming); Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional
Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 (2001).
260. See Greene et al. supra note 259.
261. Joshua Greene and his colleagues observe that
our common ancestors lived intensely social lives guided by emotions such as empathy,
anger, gratitude, jealousy, joy, love, and a sense of fairness, and all of this in the apparent
absence of moral reasoning. . . . Thus, from an evolutionary point of view, it would be
strange if human behavior were not driven in part by domain-specific social-emotional
dispositions.
Greene et al., supra note 143, at 389 (citation omitted).
Greene and his colleagues go on to suggest, however, that reactions based on these
dispositions sometimes may be revised or overriden by deliberate reasoning: “At the same time,
however, humans appear to possess a domain-general capacity for sophisticated abstract
reasoning, and it would be surprising as well if this capacity played no role in human moral
judgment.” Id. at 389–90.
262. Treviño et al., supra note 236, at 142.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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how people within the organization in positions of authority model ethical
behavior in dealing with employees and subordinates.265
This experience of ethics is especially vivid, and thus has potential to
prompt reliance on moral prototypes and intuitions. An organization that is
perceived as treating people fairly within it can acquire the status of a
cooperative venture with which people identify. Because of the connection
between moral judgments and cooperation, an organization that acquires this
status may enhance the likelihood that people will respond to many situations
with ethical implications on the basis of automatic moral intuitions. Such
intuitions help can help promote the self-regulation that Tyler describes as the
most effective foundation for legal compliance and ethical behavior.
E.

Triggering Intuitions: Challenges

We need to recognize that modern organizations attempting to trigger
constructive moral intuitions may face significant obstacles. Both increasing
scale and changing work relationships may limit the ability of an organization
to induce members to identify with it as participants in a cooperative scheme.
As organizations become larger and more far-flung, they become more
abstract to their members. An individual’s locus of attachments may well not
be the organization as a whole, but her division, work group, or project team.
These multiple and potentially conflicting loyalties throughout the organization
can constitute a vivid set of relationships that compete for allegiance with the
larger entity.266
The research on procedural justice reflects some sensitivity to this
phenomenon. It suggests that employees’ daily experiences with matters such
as compensation, promotion, assignments, and time off all contribute to a
perception of the organization as a whole. Similarly, research indicates that,
for employees, dealings with supervisors effectively are interactions with the
organization. As Treviño and Weaver note, “When it comes to ethics, leaders
are leaders, and the level (supervisory or executive) does not seem to matter
much to employees. If a middle manager puts pressure on subordinates,
employees are likely to infer that the pressure is coming from the top.”267
Since all these experiences are occasions for strengthening or weakening a
member’s allegiance to an organization, any institutional initiatives will have
to be embedded in daily operations, and members of management at all levels
will have to speak in a consistent voice. The larger the organization, of course,
the more challenging it will be to carry this out.

265. Id.
266. For an interesting case study of this phenomenon, see Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island
Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2001, at 51.
267. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 3, at 222.
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The changing nature of the relationship between employer and employee
also may limit the ability of an organization to inspire allegiance and
identification. As Katherine Stone has observed:
No longer is employment centered on a single, primary employer. Instead,
employees now expect to change jobs frequently. No longer does an employee
derive identity from a formal employment relationship with a single firm;
rather employment identity comes from attachment to an occupation, a skills
cluster, or an industry. At the same time, firms now expect a regular amount
of churning in their workplaces. They encourage employees to look upon their
jobs differently, to manage their own careers, and not to expect career-long job
268
security.

Scholars have examined the extent to which the emergence of these
conditions has given rise to a new “psychological contract” that reflects
employees’ expectations for and perceptions of their work.269 Some suggest
that under this contract, an employee no longer assumes that employment
offers opportunity to advance within the organization’s internal labor market,
but that it “offers job opportunities with other employers and marketability in
the external labor market.”270 In other words, an individual may regard her
relationship with an organization as more of a bargain between self-interested
parties, and less of an opportunity for her to participate in a mutual long-term
cooperative venture in which she identifies with the values of the entity.
Surveying the scholarship on this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but it
is clear that we will need to analyze carefully how changing expectations in the
employment relationship might affect efforts to promote identification with an
organization as a scheme of cooperation.
Finally, even if an organization is successful in eliciting intuitions that
promote strong organizational solidarity, the very success of that project may
pose risks. Such solidarity can prompt altruisim and other-regarding behavior
for the benefit of other group members—but lead people to favor the group
over “outsiders” such as customers, suppliers, and the larger community.
Strong bonds of organizational cooperation, in other words, can be a doubleedged sword. I discuss this risk in the next section. My treatment will not be
as extensive as my discussion of morally positive intuitions, but I want to
identify this issue as one that requires serious attention. At a minimum, it
should disabuse us of any notion that fostering organizational cooperation and
268. KATHERINE W.V. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
CHANGING WORKPLACE 3 (2004); see also RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF
CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM (2000).
269. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 268, at 88–92; Maddy Janssens, Luc Sels, & Inge Van den
Brande, MultipleTypes of Psychological Contracts: A Six-Cluster Solution, 56 HUM. REL. 1349
(2003); William H. Turnley & Daniel C. Feldman, The Impact of Psychological Contract
Violations on Exit, Voice, and Neglect, 52 HUM. REL. 895 (1999).
270. STONE, supra note 268, at 91 (footnote omitted).
THE
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solidarity will provide a straightforward method of promoting prosocial
behavior.
F.

Inhibiting Intuitions

Promoting attitudes and behavior that enhance cooperation within an
organization may not necessarily benefit parties outside it. Cooter and
Eisenberg underscore this with their distinction between “agent character” and
“general character” in the business firm.271 Companies that develop “firmspecific fairness norms”272 that their agents internalize can promote efficiency
by fostering cooperation within the firm. The goal is for employees to develop
good agent character, which they define as “the disposition of an agent of a
firm to adhere to the firm’s normative standards, reflexively or on the basis of
commitment even when against interest.”273 In such a firm, we would expect a
relatively low incidence of, for instance, diversion of organizational resources
for personal gain, as occurred in companies like Tyco and Adelphia. An
employee with good agent character is primed to recognize the implications of
her behavior for the success of the firm. She will, in other words, readily
appreciate that stealing from a cooperative venture weakens that venture’s
viability.
By contrast, good general character is the disposition to adhere to society’s
normative standards.274 Cooter and Eisenberg suggest that “almost every firm
benefits from its agents dealing fairly with itself and one another, although the
actual content of fairness norms differs among firms.”275 Evolutionary forces
acting through market competition should reward and select for good agent
character and firms in which a critical mass of its employees possess it. Those
forces will not, however, necessarily, favor firms that promote good general
character. Firm survival depends on relative firm profitability, and firms may
be profitable by dealing with outsiders in various ways. “Some firms . . .
benefit from their agents dealing fairly with outsiders, in which case good
agent character goes with good general character. Other firms, however,
benefit from their agents dealing unfairly with outsiders, in which case good
agent character goes with bad character.”276
The benefits associated with each strategy toward outsiders will depend on
a complex set of considerations that relate to the characteristics of the market
271. Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1723 (2001).
272. Id. at 1717.
273. Id. at 1726.
274. Id.
275. Id. The benefits to individual agents, however, may be more qualified. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Opening the “Black Box” of Culture in Law and Economics, 162 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 8 (2006).
276. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 271, at 1726.
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in which the firm operates. Don Langevoort, for instance, suggests that firms
that operate in highly competitive markets will tend to have strong corporate
cultures because of the role that culture can play in creating shared
expectations that enable people to act predictably and make decisions more
quickly.277 The internal trust, loyalty, and cooperation that characterize these
firms can give them a competitive edge. At the same time, these attributes
“may produce a heightened level of aggressiveness toward non-members.”278
As he elaborates:
A firm in a very competitive market may well benefit from an internal culture
where strong internal bonds . . . produce a set of attitudes that not only get the
group “pumped up” but also inculcate the sense that competitors (and even
customers, perhaps) are opponents in a contest. That will legitimate more
aggressive tactics than might otherwise be socially appropriate, which could be
279
a form of competitive adaptation.

As Langevoort observes, the result may be little or no attention to interests
“that have less immediate connection to the bottom line.”280
The possibility—indeed, perhaps the likelihood—of such behavior is a
lesson that emerges from much of the research on social identity and group
processes. Individuals have a pronounced tendency to identify with groups,
sometimes in ways that deeply implicate their identities. When they do so, the
basic conclusion of this research is fairly simple: “To the extent that people’s
group membership is a meaningful source of self-beliefs and self-esteem, it
should promote implicit preference for the ingroup relative to outgroups.”281
Once group identity is formed, it can trigger powerful visceral, nonconscious judgments that automatically favor group members over others.
Taking non-group interests into account then will require deliberately
overriding these emotional reactions through conscious reasoning that requires
greater cognitive effort. Joshua Greene’s theory of the cognitive operations
involved in deontological and consequentialist moral judgments can shed some
light on this dynamic.282 Greene suggests that situations that involve impacts
on people with whom we can personally identify tend to elicit non-conscious
moral responses that we justify in the categorical terms that characterize
deontological theory. By contrast, “when harmful actions are sufficiently
impersonal, they fail to push our emotional buttons, despite their seriousness,
277. See Langevoort, supra note 275, at 14.
278. Id. at 7.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 148 (2004); see also BAZERMAN, supra note
7, at 126–27.
282. See Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul (forthcoming) (manuscript on file
with author).
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and as a result we tend to think about them in a more detached, actuarial
fashion.”283 The plight of a single child trapped in a mine shaft, for instance,
can move us more than millions of children starving a hemisphere away.
We can think of this in terms of concentric circles. The closer that morally
significant events are to the core, the more likely they are to trigger nonconscious moral intuitions. The further we move from this core, the more
likely deliberate moral cognition will come into play. Thus, situations that
affect a person’s work group will tend to have more emotional salience than
those that affect the larger organization in which she works—but those that
affect the organization are likely to elicit a more visceral reaction than those
that affect society at large. The ability of employees to take account of the
social impacts of their actions thus in some circumstance may require
overcoming automatic emotional reactions that lead them to put the
organization’s interest first. This suggests that organizations that are genuinely
interested in encouraging socially responsible behavior by their members may
need to temper the very moral intuitions that they seek to elicit. They will
have to foster loyalty and commitment to the organization while encouraging
moral awareness that extends beyond its boundaries.
One way to do this can be to draw upon employees’ identification with the
organization to stress the risks to the entity of behavior that is regarded as
socially irresponsible. Behavior that harms stakeholders also can injure the
organization as a result of legal penalties, public criticism, consumer boycotts,
and diminished social perception of the legitimacy of the organization.284 This
can threaten the entity with which the employee identifies and the scheme of
cooperation that it represents. The desire to preserve the viability of this
source of identity and to avoid letting down other participants in this scheme
may provide motivation for taking the interests of stakeholders into account.
This approach involves the cultivation of more deliberate moral reasoning that
considers the impact of behavior on “outsiders.” It thus serves as a
counterweight to visceral responses that may unreflectively favor the
organization’s immediate interest. At the same time, it can have motivational
force because it relies on the emotional resonance of the employee’s
identification with the organization.
Focusing on the risks of socially irresponsible behavior need not require
that the employee identify with stakeholder interests or even regard them
important. It is sufficient that she see stakeholder concerns as pragmatic
constraints on the organization’s pursuit of narrow self-interest.

283. Id. at 11.
284. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DOROTHY THORNTON, SHADES OF
GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT (2003); Donald Langevoort, Someplace
Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1615 (2006).
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Sensitivity to the impact of her actions on the organization may also
prompt an employee to develop a more expansive sense of responsibility for
behavior that affects parties outside the organization. Behavior that harms
stakeholders can also injure the organization, as a result of legal penalties,
public criticism, consumer boycotts, and the like. This can threaten the success
of the scheme of cooperation that the entity represents. The desire to avoid
letting down other participants in this scheme may provide motivation for
taking the interests of stakeholders into account.
This is not to say that appeals to be sensitive to stakeholder interests should
focus only on this rationale, eschewing efforts to cultivate a wider sense of
civic responsibility. Those efforts also can rely on appeals to interdependence,
and on the idea of society as an even larger cooperative effort that can be
unraveled by certain behavior. It will require identification with a more
abstract community than the organization, and more reliance on moral
reasoning that involves even greater cognitive effort. Organizational leaders
will need to be credible about their commitment to larger social values for this
kind of appeal to be effective. If they can do this, they may be able to tap into
employees’ desires for involvement in socially meaningful activities. Still,
while particular events may elicit expansive conceptions of social identity and
interdependence, it is difficult to say how durable these understandings are
likely to be on a day-to-day basis.
It is worth mentioning at least one final complication likely to beset any
effort to inhibit intuitions that lead people to favor group over nongroup
interests.
An organizational culture that promotes cooperation enlists
automatic moral intuitions to make interaction among its agents smooth and
relatively predictable. We can think of these intuitions as heuristics that enable
individuals to respond rapidly as events unfold.285 Further, responses such as
sympathy, loyalty, and commitment lessen the need for negotiation, provide
motivation for other-regarding behavior, and furnish guidance in ambiguous
situations. This all increases the organization’s productivity in achieving its
objectives.
Any effort to temper moral intuitions by encouraging slower, more
deliberate moral reasoning processes runs the risk of reducing these benefits.
Attempting to weigh the impacts of organizational actions on a wide range of
stakeholders can be a time-consuming, imprecise process that generates
disagreement and complicates decision-making. Organizations thus may find
it difficult to determine the optimal balance of heuristics and deliberation.
Given the complexity of this task, the path of least resistance may well be to
privilege the heuristics and limit efforts to induce decision-making that
285. On the concept of organizational heuristics, see Donald C. Langevoort, Heuristics Inside
the Firm: Perspectives from Behavioral Law and Economics, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 91
(Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006).
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requires more cognitive effort. Such tendencies may be especially likely in,
say, companies that operate in highly competitive markets, where seizing
opportunities quickly may be crucial to survival. This underscores that taking
account of moral intuitions in analyzing and shaping organizational culture
will be a complicated process, which requires sensitivity to the particular
context in which a given organization must function.
G. Summary
Research on moral cognition suggests that fostering an ethical
organizational culture requires a complex strategy. An organization needs to
elicit some non-conscious moral intuitions, while simultaneously trying to
blunt the impact of others by encouraging more deliberate moral reasoning.
Triggering salutary intuitions may be more successful the more that individuals
regard the organization as a cooperative venture with which they identify.
Emphasizing organizational values can enlist intrinsic motivation for ethical
behavior, prompting the use of a perceptual frame that does not engage in costbenefit analysis in choosing among different courses of action. Strong and
consistent sanctions for misconduct can underscore the organization’s
commitment to the values that it professes. Finally, an organization will have
greater success in these efforts if its members believe that it treats them in
according with fair process.
Both the increasing scale of organizations and the attenuation of loyalties
between employees and employers will pose challenges to any attempt to
promote a culture with which individuals strongly identify. Moreover, the very
success in fostering such identification can lead to reliance on other more
pernicious intuitions that may lead individuals to favor the organization at the
expense of its stakeholders. Sensitivity to broader social interests therefore
will require conscious efforts to take into account the impact of behavior on
more abstract constituencies.
All these observations are at a high level of generality, which neglects the
ways in which the specific challenges that organizations face will depend on
their particular characteristics. The history of an organization, the types of
goods or services that it provides, the competitiveness of the market in which it
operates, its geographic scope, the technology on which it relies, and the
personalities of the individuals in positions of authority are but a few of the
variables that will shape the task of attempting to promote an ethical culture.
More fine-grained analysis of the role of moral intuitions in organizational
behavior ideally will provide greater insight into how these dynamics play out.
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CONCLUSION
Numerous observers have pointed out the limits of rule-following as a
recipe for ethical behavior in the modern organization. This has shifted focus
to the elusive concept of culture as an ostensibly firmer foundation for virtuous
conduct. There is much to this critique and recommendation. Even, however,
if we make simplifying assumptions about the ability of organizational leaders
to speak with one voice in conveying a set of consistent expectations that all
members will interpret identically, creating and sustaining an ethical
organizational culture faces significant challenges.
Work in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics in recent years
has emphasized that appreciating the operation and influence of non-conscious
cognitive processes is crucial for anyone who hopes to shape behavior in
organizations. An important piece of the puzzle is gaining a better
understanding of when and how responses arise that we think of as distinctly
moral. An emerging body of work on moral intuitions may help with this
project. It suggests that emotion plays a significant role in moral judgment,
and that reasoning often is employed after, rather than prior to, making such
judgments. I have suggested, albeit in somewhat stylized fashion, how we
might begin to draw on the insights of this research to enhance the likelihood
of ethical behavior in organizations. This is based on my belief that we should
explore the possibility that “the mechanisms for changing the ethics of a
culture lie in understanding the prototypes that are shared across the
organization and the moral rules that are emphasized within the
organization.”286
Gaining a fuller appreciation of the nature of moral intuitions does not, of
course, mean that we must accept the desirability of either particular intuitions
or the process by which they arise. Intuitions are a mixed bag.287 We may
regard some as salutary, and thus as worth reinforcing, and others as
pernicious, and therefore in need of countering. As Joshua Greene suggests,
our moral judgment may consist of “a complex hodgepodge of emotional
responses and rational (re)constructions, shaped by biological and cultural
forces, that do some things well and other things extremely poorly.”288
Furthermore, despite the influence of moral intuitions, we also can be
moved by moral reasoning that precedes, rather than simply follows, moral
judgment in some cases. Even if the research that I have described indicates
that we tend to rely more on intuition and less on reasoning than we believe,
we are capable in some circumstances of revising or overriding our intuitive

286. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745.
287. See generally DAVID G. MYERS, INTUITIONS: ITS POWERS AND PERILS (2002).
288. Joshua
Greene,
The
Moral
Significance
of
Moral
Psychology,
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/ (scroll to “The Moral Significance of Moral Psychology”).
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judgments based on conscious deliberation. Ideally, further research will
provide more insight into the conditions that are hospitable to this process.
Before we begin to celebrate the steady march of reason in taming
intuitions, however, I want to end on a note of caution. We need to consider
whether the accelerating demands on our attention in modern life are likely to
reduce, rather than enhance, the role of deliberate reasoning. It is a common
complaint that we often feel inundated by a flood of stimulation and
information, an increasing portion of which consists of visual cues that directly
engage our emotions, much of which calls for virtually immediate replies from
us. As the chair of one large law firm observes:
Today, because of the rapid pace of the business world and the demands of
technology, we have a substantial amount of pressure to provide instantaneous
responses. From our desks, we summon the powers of technology to help us
meet our clients’ demands for instantaneous responses. That has reduced
somewhat the opportunity for collegiality and collaboration, as well as the
chance to be thoughtful and reflective, that we once enjoyed. To some extent
289
we have traded contemplation and collaboration for efficiency.

As a result, we may implicitly rely on moral intuitions in the coming years
even more than we do now. If this scenario is plausible, it underscores the
urgency of better understanding the relationship between moral intuition and
moral reasoning in the kind of complex beings that we are.

289. R. Bruce McLean, On Being a Successful Lawyer, in INSIDE THE MINDS: LEADING
LAWYERS: THE ART & SCIENCE OF BEING A SUCCESSFUL LAWYER 143, 157 (2002).
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